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public confidence in the civil service, this consideration is irrelevant to the exercise of
the pardoning power.
Furthermore, courts have recognized the broad power of the legislature to fix
the terms and conditions of public employment.4 Legislative regulation in this field
is invalidated only when arbitrary or unreasonable.'s It may be well argued that unless
a convicted person is given an opportunity upon expiration of his sentence to show im-
provement of his moral character and to regain all civil rights and privileges, no incen-
tive to moral rehabilitation remains; legislation denying the right to show good moral
character is therefore unsound. But this argument does not extend alone to recipients
of executive clemency, nor does it afford a basis for invalidating legislation which fails
to distinguish between such persons and persons who have served the full sentences im-
posed upon them.
Constitutional Law-State Statute Penalizing Bringing Non-resident Indigents
into State-[United States].-A California statute provides that any person bringing
into the state an indigent non-resident, knowing him to be indigent, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.x In January, iQ4o, the defendant brought his brother-in-law into California
from Texas; he was convicted in a justice court of violating the statute. The superior
court affirmed the conviction, holding the statute constitutional. On appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, held, that the statute is unconstitutional as a bur-
den on interstate commerce. In a concurring opinion,2 Mr. Justice Douglas, expressing
no views on the commerce clause, urged that the privileges and immunities clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was applicable. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring separate-
ly, admitted that the commerce clause was applicable under the precedents but con-
tended that the decision should rest solely on the privileges and immunities clause.
Edwards v. California.3
By restricting state action burdening interstate commerce, the principal case runs
counter to a trend indicated by recent decisions in which the power of the states to un-
dertake action affecting interstate commerce has been supported.4 This trend is in
14 Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, X27-28 (1926), with United States v.
Perkins, i6 U.S. 483,484 (1886), and Butler v. White, 83 Fed. 578, 582 (C.C. W.Va. 1897).
Cf. Fire Dept. v. Gilmore, 149 N.Y. 453, 44 N.E. 177 (x896); Commonwealth v. Sisson, 189
Mass. 247, 75 N.E. 61g (I9O5); Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Atl. 743 (Md. App. 1933); Prichard v.
Battle, 17 S.E. (2d) 393 (Va. 1941).
1s Cowen v. Reary, 283 N.Y. 232, 28 N.E. (2d) 390 (194o), noted in i St. John's L. Rev. go
(1940); Fink v. Finegan, 270 N.Y. 356, 1 N.E. (2d) 462 (1936); see Powell, The Right to Work
for the State, i6 Col. L. Rev. 99 (igi6).
x Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code (Deering, 1937) § 2615. The general problem of legal
restrictions on interstate migration of indigent persons is considered in Depression Migrants
and the States, 53 Harv. L. Rev. o3i (I94O); Interstate Migration and Personal Liberty, 40
Col. L. Rev. 1032 (x94o); State Economic Protectionism and the Federal Constitution, 34 I.
L. Rev. 44, 50-52, 59-60 (1939).
2 Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Murphy concurred in the opinion of Mr. Justice Doug-
las.
3 62 S. Ct. 164 (I94i), noted in 42 Col. L. Rev. i39 (1942).
4 California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941) (upholding a state regulation of passenger
agents); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (I94O) (state regulation of motor carriers); Nelson
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marked contrast to the recent expansion of the interstate commerce concept to sus-
tain congressional legislation. To establish that interstate commerce was involved in
the instant case, the Court relied primarily on cases which sustain federal statutes at-
tacking the problem of crimes such as the lann Act. These cases the Court used in
particular to support the statement that no commercial motive is necessary.6 The ap-
plication to the unrelated facts of the instant case of precedents from this specialized
field, in which policy considerations are relatively obvious,7 thus effects an expansion
of the concept of interstate commerce as applied to persons. Furthermore, the cases
which sustain congressional *power in the field of crime prevention do not hold that the
states lack concurrent power over the same conduct. The principal case, by contrast,
restricts state power and has no immediate relation to the power of Congress to regu--
late interstate migrations. In fact, by expressly refusing to discuss the scope of federal
power in this field,$ the Court leaves open the possibility that congressional regulation
might be unconstitutional.9 However incongruous this suggestion may appear under
the commerce clause analysis, it fits in more nearly with the position taken by the con-
curring justices, that a fundamental right of national citizenship is involved.
The recent trend to greater freedom for the states to regulate, and particularly to
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (i94i) (state use tax). See Grant, State Power to Pro-
hibit Interstate Commerce, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 34 (i937); Sholley, Negative Implications of the
Commerce Clause, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 556 (1936).
s Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act applies though there is no
commercial motive); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 3o8 (1913) (Mann Act valid); United
States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 (1919) (Congress can forbid the interstate transportation of liquor
for personal use).
6The other cases cited on this point involve the business of interstate transportation.
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 8o (941); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 154 U.S. 204 (1894); Leisy v. Hardin, x35 U.S. oo (i8go); Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, xi4 U.S. 196 (I885).
7This field has been the scene of a notable extension of the power of Congress. Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936)
(Federal Kidnapping Act). Perhaps the furthest reach of congressional power under the inter-
state commerce clause is found in 48 Stat. 782 (i934), 18 U.S.C.A. § 4o8e (Supp. 194), mak-
ing it a federal crime to leave any state to escape prosecution for crimes committed therein or
to avoid giving testimony. The statute has been sustained in United States v. Miller, 17 F.
Supp. 65 (Ky. 1936), and United States v. McClure, i5 F. Supp. 931 (Tenn. 1936), noted in
37 Col. L. Rev. 482 (i937). See Brabner-Smith, The Commerce Clause and the New Fed-
eral Extradition Statute, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (i934).
s Edwards v. California, 62 S. Ct. 164, 168 (194i).
9 A different but related question is the power of Congress by affirmative action to allow
the states to make "reasonable" regulations of the migrant problem, such as a requirement of
proof that the migrant will not be a burden on the community. Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S.
431 (1936); In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (i8gi). This depends on the "silence of Congress"
theory of the commerce clause restrictions on the states. See Bikl6, The Silence of Con-
gress, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1927); Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce
Clause, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 583-88 (1936). The present status of the theory is not
clear. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. i, 20-28 (i94o);
Grant, State Power to Prohibit Interstate Commerce, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 34, 51-75 0937).
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tax, interstate tommerce, together with doubts as to whether the migration of "Okies"
actually involves interstate commerce, apparently disturbed the concurring justices."o
Consequently, although not stating that the commerce clause was inapplicable, they
turned to a clause of the Constitution which looks more to the personal rights of in-
dividuals than to the balance of commercial interests.ir In employing the privileges
and immunities clause the concurring justices do not depart from the limited inter-
pretation established in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 2 that only those rights are protected
"which owe their existence to the federal government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws." In Crandall v. Nevada'3 it was in effect said to be a right of na-
tional citizenship, implied in the Constitution, to move freely from state to state. And
in the Slaughterhouse Cases'4 that right was recognized as protected by the privileges
and immunities clause even under the limited interpretation developed in that case."s
Thus the use of the clause by the concurring justices in the principal case does not con-
stitute an extension of its protection to all "fundamental rights,""' 6 a possible interpre-
tation which, it has been feared, would mean an intolerable control over state action.x7
"0 Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, stated: "But I am of the opinion that the right of per-
sons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our constitutional
system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines." Edwards v.
California, 62 S. Ct. 164, 169 (1941).
Mr. Justice Jackson, also concurring, stated: "To hold that the measure of his rights is the
commerce clause is likely to result eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in de-
naturing human rights." Ibid., at 171.
1 Itis interesting to speculate on why neither the majority nor the minority mention the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, strongly argued in appellant's brief. See
Gitow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925); cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (940)
(statute forbidding picketing invalid under Fourteenth Amendment). It has been suggested
-that the Court desires to use the due process clause as little as possible in substantive matters,
and that civil rights will come to be protected by the privileges and immunities clause. 34 Ill.
L. Rev. 998, 1002 (194o), noting Madden v. Kentucky, 3o9 U.S. 83 (rq4o). But see Mr.
Justice Jackson, concurring in Edwards v. California, 62 S. Ct. 164, 171 (941): "While in-
stances of valid privileges and immunities must be but few .......
12 16 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (1873).
X3 6 Wall. (U.S.) 35 (i867). The concurring justices' reliance on this case illustrates the re-
dundancy of the privileges and immunities clause, for in this case the citizen's right to move
from state to state was protected without the aid of the Fourteenth Amendment.
14 16 Wall. (U.S.) 3'6, 79 (1873).
is In several dicta since the Slaughterhouse Cases the right of free movement from state to
state has been cited as an instance of a privilege and immunity of a citizen of the United
States. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (i9o8); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270,
274 (I9oo). See in general Bowman, The United States Citizen's Privilege of State Residence,
io Boston U. L. Rev. 459 (1930).
"6 Slaughterhouse Cases, i6 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 95, 97 (1873) (Mr. Justice Field, dissenting);
cf. Corfield v. Coryell, Fed. Cas. No. 3230, at 551 (1825) (privileges and immunities under U.S.
Const. art. 4, § 2).
'7 See McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, 4 Iowa L.
Bull. 219 (i9i8); Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate
v. Harvey, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262 (939). The desire to keep the privileges and immunities
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Another possible disadvantage, however, is that, since the clause by its terms does not
protect aliens, many of whom are found among migratory workers, a decision based
upon it might not have as wide an effect as the justices may desire.' 8
One difficulty in holding that the statute infringes the privileges and immunities of a
citizen of the United States is that the privileges and immunities discussed by the con-
curring justices are those of the indigent person brought into the state and not of the
defendant who transported him.'9 But clearly the only purpose of the penalty imposed
by the statute is to restrain the migration of certain persons into the state; and it is by
prosecution of persons in the position of the present defendant that the unconstitu-
tional end of the legislature is sought to be attained.20 The migrant can be fully pro-
tected from this restraint only if the person transporting him is protected.
2
Apart from the limitation that the decision in the instant case does not restrain ex-
clusionary action by individuals,2 its practical consequences may depend largely on its
effect on state statutes providing for compulsory removal of non-resident indigents to
states where they have settlements."s If such statutes are valid, the effect of the instant
case may be greatly reduced, for little is gained by holding that a person may come into
a state if that state may expel him if he proves to be in need. It is true that the mere
clause within narrow bounds has recently been indicated by the overruling of Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (935) (state tax on out-of-state loans invalid under that clause), in
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (I94O), noted in 34 Ill. L. Rev. 998 (194o). The possible
restraint on state action might not make so much difference as the writers think, however.
Since Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), much the same result has been attained under
the due process clause as was desired for the privileges and immunities clause by the dissenting
justices in the Slaughterhouse Cases, i6 Wall. (U.S.) 36, 83, 111, 124 (x873), though in the
Slaughterhouse Cases themselves the due process clause was considered inapplicable. Ibid., at
80.
!8 But see Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39, 41 (i9x); cf. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (gs).
'9 Cf. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139, 140 (1939) (competing cor-
poration cannot challenge validity of statutory grant of power to TVA); Hatch v. Reardon,
204 U.S. 152, i6o (,907) (only person for whose benefit constitutional provision is intended may
complain of unconstitutionality of state law).
20 In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 35 (1867), the stage coach company was protected
on the ground that the tax infringed the privileges and immunities of the passengers. Cf. De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (i937) (state cannot make unlawful the activity of assist-
ing in a lawful meeting).
21 Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (i9i5) (employee may complain when operation of law
infringing his rights is not directed against him but against the employer).
"2 Such action has been held to be beyond the control of the Federal Government. United
States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
23 While many of the provisions for removal simply empower state relief authorities to
expend money to transport the indigent to a place where he has a settlement, e.g., Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1941) c. 107, § 16 (on request of applicant for relief), several states provide for court
process by which the iridigent is removed, e.g., N.Y. Social Welfare Law (McKinney, i94I)
§ 125. The New York removal statute was recently considered in In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417,
28 N.E. (2d) 895 (194o); the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without deciding the
constitutional question. Finch, J., dissenting, considered that the question should be decided
and that the statute should be upheld, largely on the ground of the state's control over its re-
lief funds. Ibid., at 436 and 903.
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prohibition of restraint on a person's entrance into a state does not mean that the state
is obliged to grant relief to him; by virtue of the proprietary aspect of their controlofre-
lief money 4 and the "gratuitous" character of relief expenditures,25 the states are still
free to put such residence or settlement requirements on relief applicants as they de-
sire.26 Residence requirements on relief may deter movement to a locality or impel re-
turn to a place where relief or other aid may be obtained; nevertheless, the non-resident
still has the option of remaining to seek work or to be near relatives. There is room for
argument, however, that discrimination on the basis of settlement may amount to de-
nial of the equal protection of the laws.27 Moreover, if there are many indigent persons
without settlement in the state, the lack of constitutional requirement that relief must
be granted them may not be controlling. Considerations of public health and safety, in
addition to humanitarian motives, make it necessary that they be cared for.
It is with reference to the constitutionality of a removal statute that the difference
between the majority and concurring opinions in the instant case becomes of greatest
significance. It is difficult to see how a removal statute so constitutes a burden on in-
terstate commerce as to be covered by the majority opinion in the instant case.28 There
is, of course, the analogy to the "original package"29 doctrine, by which the state may
not regulate goods for some time after they have been transported in interstate com-
merce. But even though this doctrine is no longer strictly limited to the "original
package,"30 the line must be drawn somewhere. Moreover, its application is awkward,
to say the least, in a case like this. On the other hand, the use of the privilege and im-
munities clause in the instant case would seem to have made the clause equally ap-
24 Cf. Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (state may discriminate in favor of its own
citizens in employment on public works), criticized in Powell, The Right to Work for the State,
16 Col. L. Rev. 99 (i9i6). See In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 436, 28 N.E. (2d) 895, 903 (1940).
However, in contributing to state relief funds, the Federal Government may impose certain
requirements on the states. Insecurity under the Social Security Act, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 127
(1941).
2S People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 3o N.E. (2d) 46 (i94o); Holland v.
Cedar Grove, 230 Wis. 177, 282 N.W. 1i1 (i939); cf. Rudolph v. United States, 36 App. D.C.
379 (igI).
26 The residence requirement in California has been three years. Cal. Welfare and Institu-
tions Code (Deering, 1937) § 2555. The requirement was increased to five years in the Un-
employment Relief Appropriation Act of i94o, Cal. Stat. (x941) 125. For descriptions of state
settlement requirements, see American Public Welfare Ass'n, Compilation of Settlement Laws
of All States in the United States (i939); Hirsch, Our Settlement Laws (1933). A comparison
of the two last cited works indicates that settlement laws are on the increase, both in numbers
and in length of time required. See 8 Univ. Ch. L. Rev. 544, 545, 547 (194I), noting People
ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 3o N.E. (2d) 46 (i94o).
27 U.S. Const. amend. z4, § . Though the states are not forbidden by this clause to classify
subjects of legislation, the classification must have a reasonable relation to the object of the
legislation. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (Ig*2o); cf. New York Rapid Transit
Corp. v. City of New York, 3o3 U.S. 573 (1938).
28 See Finch, J., dissenting, In re Chibillo, 283 N.Y. 417,435, 28 N.E. (2d) 895, 9o3 (1940).
29 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) *419, *446 (1827). \
30 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 51 (1935).
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plicable to a removal statute;3' a decision on this ground would thus have been con-
siderably more effective in preventing state action which discriminates against persons
solely on the ground that they are indigent and non-resident.
Federal Jurisdiction-Inclusion of Future Pension Payments in Computing
Jurisdictional Amount-Judicial Review of Veteran's Pension Award-[Federal].-
In igig the plaintiff married James Edward Calhoun in New York City and in 1921
was granted an interlocutory decree in a suit in a New Ybrk court to annul the mar-
riage. No final decree was entered, and subsequently the plaintiff and Calhoun co-
habited. In 1922 Calhoun married the defendant in Maryland, after which, at different
times, he resided both with her and with the plaintiff. In 1934 Calhoun was rated men-
tally incompetent and, as a Spanish War veteran, was awarded compensation. The
defendant was appointed his guardian and received the payments from the Veterans'
Administration, and when Calhoun died in I937 she was awarded a widow's pension.
The plaintiff brought an action in the federal district court for a declaratory judgment
that she was the widow of Calhoun on the ground that the New York annulment decree
was not final and hence was inconclusive under New York law and also for an account-
ing from the defendant for $i,5oo received by her as the alleged widow of Calhoun.
Held, that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim because the determination
of the plaintiff's status as widow is reserved to the state courts, the requisite jurisdic-
tional amount was not involved, and awards of the Veterans' Administration are final
and not subject to judicial review. Calhoun v. Lange.1
Federal courts do not have original jurisdiction in divorce or other proceedings in-
volving domestic relations,2 but they have taken jurisdiction when, as in the present
case, the validity or effect of a divorce decree is collaterally attacked,3 provided that
the diversity and jurisdictional amount requirements are met.
Although the court's reasoning is not clearly expressed, the second ground of the
decision may have been that the pension payments-past and future-were only col-
laterally involved in the controversy and hence could not be considered in computing
the jurisdictional amount. But this collateral effect doctrine has previously been ap-
plied only where plaintiffs have sought to include sums which were recoverable in sub-
sequent proceedings based upon the action before the court.4 A realistic view of the
31 Mr.Justice Douglas, dissenting, in Edwards v. California, 62 S. Ct. 164, 169 (1941), quoted
from Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (igoo): "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion,
the right to move from place to place according to inclination, is an attribute of personal
liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." But see
Finch, J., dissenting, In re Chirillo, 283 N.Y. 417, 436, 28 N.E. (2d) 895, 903 (i94o).
x 40 F. Supp. 264 (Md. 194). The plaintiff rested jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship
and the fact that the present reasonably anticipated value of the pension exceeded $3,00o.
'Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930).
3 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877); Wheelock v. Freiwald, 66 F. (2d) 694 (C.C.A. 8th
1933).
4 In New England Mortgage Security Co. v. Gay, 145 U S. 123 (1892), the plaintiff sued to
recover on the defendant's notes, secured by a $20,ooo mortgage. Full recovery was denied on
the ground that the interest charged on the loan was usurious. The plaintiff appealed, seeking
